This assessment was produced using the Zbigniew Protocol - an AI-assisted intelligence analysis methodology that applies structured analytical techniques: confidence-rated judgments, cui bono analysis, falsifiability criteria, adversary testing, and sourced predictions with deadlines. Pattern recognition, not prophecy.

ZBIGNIEW Assessment: Intermarium Alliance Framework

Assessment ID: ASMT-2026-003 Date: 2026-01-21 Classification: STRATEGIC Confidence: 4/5

Executive Summary

The Intermarium (Miedzymorze) concept - a geopolitical alliance spanning from the Baltic to the Black Sea and beyond - represents Poland’s most ambitious regional leadership opportunity. Originally conceived by Jozef Pilsudski post-WWI, the concept has evolved through the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) and Bucharest Nine (B9) into practical implementation. This assessment analyzes the potential for expanding these frameworks to include historical allies with demonstrated pro-Polish sentiment: Turkey, Hungary, Romania, Iran, and the Nordic-Baltic states.

1. Historical Intermarium Concept

1.1 Pilsudski’s Original Vision (1918-1939)

Scope: A federation of states between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas as counterweight to Russian and German imperialism.

Proposed Members:

Core: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine
Extended: Finland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia
Maximum: Scandinavia, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece (Arctic to Mediterranean)

Why It Failed:

Polish distrust from Czechoslovakia and Lithuania (border disputes)
Inter-regional tensions among potential members
Great power opposition (Germany, Soviet Union)
Lack of economic integration mechanism

What Survived: Only the Polish-Romanian Alliance (1921-1939) materialized as binding treaty.

1.2 Modern Implementations

Framework	Founded	Members	Focus
Three Seas Initiative (3SI)	2016	13 EU states + partners	Infrastructure, energy, digital
Bucharest Nine (B9)	2015	9 NATO states	Security coordination
NB8	Various	8 Nordic-Baltic	Security, defense
European Sky Shield (ESSI)	2022	20+	Air defense procurement

2. Countries with Historical Pro-Polish Sentiment

2.1 TURKEY - “600 Years of Unbroken Relations”

Historical Foundation:

First diplomatic contact: 1414 (4 years after Grunwald)
Treaty of Perpetual Friendship: 1923 (Poland first European country to recognize Turkish Republic)
Polonezkoy (Adampol): Polish settlement near Istanbul since 1842

WWII Support:

Turkey defended Polish Embassy in Ankara against Nazi demands
Provided refuge for Polish aviation engineers (1940s)
Maintained diplomatic recognition throughout war

Modern Status:

2021: Turkey FM described relations as “strategic partnership”
2023: Celebrated 100th anniversary of Friendship Treaty
NATO allies since Poland joined in 1999

Sentiment Indicator: HIGH - Warm public sentiment, institutional memory of friendship

2.2 HUNGARY - “Polak Wegier dwa bratanki”

Historical Foundation:

Defensive alliance: 1108 AD (medieval shared border)
1000+ years of documented friendship
Hungarian Crown sheltered Polish kings (Jadwiga, Stefan Batory)

Mutual Support:

WWII: Hungary helped Warsaw Uprising fighters (weapons, food) despite Axis alignment
1956: Poland supported Hungarian Revolution against Soviets
March 23: Official Polish-Hungarian Friendship Day (since 2007)

Modern Status:

V4 (Visegrad Group) partners
Shared EU policy positions (migration, sovereignty)
Complex: Orban’s Russia relations create friction with Polish security stance

Sentiment Indicator: VERY HIGH - Deep cultural bond, some political divergence on Russia

2.3 ROMANIA - “The Only Alliance That Worked”

Historical Foundation:

Defensive Alliance Convention: March 3, 1921
Only Intermarium bilateral treaty successfully ratified
Extended 1926, 1931 (automatic renewals)

WWII Role:

September 1939: Allowed 120,000 Polish troops to evacuate through Romania
Interned soldiers treated well, many escaped to France/UK
Polish government-in-exile initially evacuated through Romania

Modern Status:

B9 co-founders (Duda-Iohannis initiative, 2015)
3SI active members
2023: Romanian-Polish Solidarity Day established (March 3)
NATO Black Sea coordination

Sentiment Indicator: HIGH - Strong institutional ties, shared threat perception (Russia)

2.4 IRAN - “The Children of Isfahan”

Historical Foundation:

1602: First Polish envoy to Persia
1795: Iran refused to recognize Partition of Poland (alongside Ottoman Empire)
Commercial ties through Lwow-Persia trade routes

WWII Refugee Haven:

1942: ~120,000 Polish refugees arrived from Soviet deportation
Shah provided private gardens as refugee camps
Isfahan: “City of Polish Children” (2,300 orphans sheltered)
2,800 Poles died in Iran; Polish cemeteries in Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, Ahvaz

Cultural Legacy:

Polish radio station and newspapers operated in Iran
Pierogi introduced to Iranian cuisine (still common)
Some Poles married Iranians and stayed permanently

Modern Complications:

Iran under sanctions (US, EU)
Nuclear program tensions
Regional proxy conflicts
Limited official engagement possible

Sentiment Indicator: HIGH (popular) / CONSTRAINED (official)

Iranian people remember Polish refugees warmly
Government-to-government relations limited by geopolitics

2.5 FINLAND - “Nordic-Baltic Extension”

Historical Connection:

Pilsudski’s Prometheism supported Finnish independence
Shared anti-Russian strategic interest (historical and current)
Similar defense posture evolution

Modern Integration:

2024: Finland attended B9 meeting for first time
European Sky Shield Initiative member
Nordic-Baltic defense coordination with Poland
2024: Polish PM invited to NB8 summit (Harpsund)

Sentiment Indicator: MODERATE-HIGH - Growing security alignment, less historical depth

3. Alliance Framework Analysis

3.1 Concentric Circles Model

                    TIER 1: CORE SECURITY
              +-----------------------------------+
              |     Baltic States + Romania       |
              |         (B9 + 3SI core)           |
              +-----------------------------------+
                           ^
                    TIER 2: EXTENDED ALLIANCE
         +--------------------------------------------+
         |   Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Bulgaria     |
         |        (V4 + 3SI + B9 overlap)             |
         +--------------------------------------------+
                           ^
                    TIER 3: NORDIC BRIDGE
    +-----------------------------------------------------+
    |     Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland        |
    |              (NB8 + ESSI + Northern Group)           |
    +-----------------------------------------------------+
                           ^
                    TIER 4: STRATEGIC PARTNERS
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|    Turkey (NATO), Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine (assoc.)      |
|              South Caucasus + Black Sea extension            |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
                           ^
                    TIER 5: HISTORICAL FRIENDS
      +-------------------------------------------------+
      |              Iran (soft engagement)              |
      |     Cultural diplomacy, diaspora memory          |
      +-------------------------------------------------+

3.2 Cui Bono Analysis

Actor	Benefit	Risk
Poland	Regional leadership, security depth, economic corridors	Overextension, EU friction
Baltic States	Strategic depth, energy access	Dependency on Polish commitment
Romania	NATO flank reinforcement, 3SI investment	Competition for leadership
Hungary	Infrastructure investment, V4 cohesion	Russia policy divergence
Turkey	European foothold, NATO relevance	EU tensions, authoritarian concerns
Finland	Baltic defense integration	Drawn into Central European politics
Iran	Soft bridge to Europe	Sanctions complications

3.3 Who Opposes

Russia - Directly threatened by encirclement
Germany - Reduced Central European dominance
France - Competing EU defense integration vision
EU Commission - Parallel structures challenge Brussels
US (partially) - Supports B9/3SI, wary of Turkey complexity

4. Pattern Recognition (ZBIGNIEW)

4.1 Historical Pattern: Failed Confederations

Every attempt at Central European confederation has failed when:

Imposed from outside (Habsburg, Soviet)
Led by dominant power seeking hegemony
Lacking economic integration component
Facing unified great power opposition

Success conditions:

Voluntary, consensus-based
Economic benefits clear and distributed
External threat motivation
Great power sponsor or neutrality

4.2 Current Opportunity Window

Favorable Factors:

US supports Central European cohesion (counters Russia, hedges EU)
Ukraine war demonstrates shared threat
3SI already institutionalized
NATO membership provides security umbrella
Energy independence creates common project

Unfavorable Factors:

Hungary’s Russia-friendly position
EU-Turkey tensions
Iran sanctions
German economic leverage
Internal V4 disagreements

4.3 Recommended Approach

DO:

Build on existing institutions (3SI, B9) rather than creating new ones
Emphasize infrastructure/economic benefits over military bloc rhetoric
Cultivate historical narratives (shared memory diplomacy)
Engage Turkey through NATO mechanisms
Maintain soft cultural ties with Iran (diaspora, academic)
Welcome Nordic states into B9/3SI orbit

DON’T:

Frame as anti-EU or anti-German
Push Hungary into Russia’s arms with ultimatums
Overcommit to South Caucasus complexities
Expect Iran engagement beyond cultural level
Seek formal alliance structures that trigger opposition

5. Specific Recommendations

5.1 Immediate (1 year)

Turkey: Propose bilateral defense industry cooperation (drones, ammunition)
Romania: Joint Black Sea security initiative, March 3 summit
Hungary: V4+ cultural diplomacy, avoid Russia ultimatums
Finland: Formalize B9+ participation, defense procurement coordination
Iran: Academic/cultural exchange only (Polish studies, refugee memorial)

5.2 Medium Term (5 years)

3SI Expansion: Associate membership for Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia
Nordic-Baltic-Polish Corridor: Defense industrial base integration
Black Sea Strategy: Romania-Poland-Turkey coordination
Energy Independence: Baltic-Black Sea pipeline/LNG network completion
Historical Memory: Polish-Iranian refugee memorial in Isfahan

5.3 Long Term (20 years)

Intermarium Economic Zone: Enhanced trade facilitation, infrastructure network
Regional Defense Identity: NATO-compatible but autonomous capability
Cultural Soft Power: Polish language/culture institutes across region
Diaspora Network: Poles in allied countries as cultural bridges

6. Risk Assessment

6.1 Failure Modes

Scenario	Probability	Impact	Mitigation
Hungary defects to Russian orbit	20%	High	Maintain V4 dialogue, avoid isolation
Turkey-EU break	30%	Medium	Engage through NATO, bilateral
US withdraws from Europe	15%	Critical	Accelerate European self-reliance
Germany blocks 3SI	25%	Medium	Emphasize EU compatibility
Internal CE disputes	40%	Medium	Mediation role, consensus building

6.2 Red Lines

No alliance structures outside NATO that could be seen as replacement
No engagement with Iran that violates sanctions
No forced choice between EU and Intermarium
No exclusion of Germany from infrastructure benefits

7. Validation Criteria

Prediction (5-year): If Poland successfully leads 3SI/B9 expansion:

3SI membership or association will include Turkey by 2030
Nordic-Baltic-Polish defense coordination will be formalized
Romania will be Poland’s closest bilateral partner
Hungary will remain in structures despite Russia policy divergence

Falsification: If by 2028:

3SI stagnates below 15 members/partners
Hungary exits V4 or B9
Nordic states create separate defense bloc excluding Poland
Turkey-Poland relations downgraded

8. Sources

Primary

Secondary

Assessment Status: ACTIVE Next Review: 2026-Q2 Related Predictions: PRED-2026-003, PRED-2026-004

“Poland’s security comes not from isolation, but from being indispensable.”